Second Place by Owens, Kimberly & Scholer, Leah
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
David E. Snodgrass Moot Court Competition Student Scholarship
11-13-2002
Second Place
Kimberly Owens
Leah Scholer
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/moot_court
This Brief - Prize 02 is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in David E. Snodgrass Moot Court Competition by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kimberly Owens and Leah Scholer, Second Place (2002).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/moot_court/50
SECOND PLACE
IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY On behalf of Henry C. Lee, 
Commissioner, Office of Adult Probation, on 
behalf of Robert Bosco, Director, John 
Armstrong, Commissioner,
Petitioners,
JOHN DOE, Individually and on behalf of 
others similarly situated; SAMUEL POE, 
Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated.
Respondents.
RONALD O. OTTE, Commissioner, Alaska 
Department of Public Safety; BRUCE M. 
BOTELHO, Alaska Attorney General,
Petitioners,
V.
JOHN DOE I, JANE DOE, and 
JOHN DOE 11,
Respondents.
Case No, 01-1231
Case No. 01-0729
PETITIONERS’ BRIEF
Round#!: 3:40p.m.
November 13,2002
Kimberly Owens
Leah Scholer
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102
(415) 565-4600
Counsel for Petitioners
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the Connecticut sex offender registration act, which discloses true and accurate public 
criminal history information to allow the public to monitor their children’s interactions with 
neighbor sex offenders, comply with due process where the sex offenders’ underlying 
offenses, and not an act by Connecticut, cause the new set of registration duties?
2. Does the Alaska sex offender registration act, a law that allows the state to passively disclose 
true information to concerned citizens, fall outside the scope of the ex post facto prohibition 
because the legislature intended it to help protect Alaska citizens and because it requires sex 
offenders to simply register with local authorities, and in no manner punishes, disables, or 
restrains them?
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PETITIONERS’ BRIEF
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim, 
and REVERSE the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the 
ex post facto claim.
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appears at 271 
F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
appears at 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo questions of law. Elder v. Holloway^ 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
L Connecticut Sex Offenders’ Due Process Claim.
On February 22, 1999, John Doe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 84.) Doe alleged that the 
Connecticut Sex Offender Registry Act ("CT-SORA”) violated the Due Process and the Ex Post 
Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 84.) Doe sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief for himself and a class of others similarly situated. (J.A. 84.) Doe moved for 
summary judgment on the due process claim on July 9, 1999. (J.A. 85.) The defendants, 
Connecticut agencies and employees responsible for administering the CT-SORA, cross-moved 
for summary judgment. (J.A. 85.)
On March 31, 2001, the district court granted summary judgment to Doe on the due 
process claim and to the defendants on the ex post facto claim. (J.A. 85.) On April 18, 2001, 
Doe filed motions for certification of the due process claim class, for a declaratory judgment, and 
for injunctive relief. (J.A. 85.)
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The district court issued a permanent injunction on May 17,2001, which enjoined the 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety (“CDPS”) from disclosing information to the public 
from the sex offender registry, and required the CDPS to take down the registry website. (J.A. 
85.) On May 18, 2001, the district court certified the due process class, and issued a declaratory 
judgment in favor of the class on the due process claim. (J.A. 59-60.) The defendants moved for 
a stay of the injunction, which the district court denied on May 18, 2001, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied on June 5, 2001. (J.A. 85.) The defendants 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (J.A. 73.)
On October 19, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
the judgment of the district court. (J.A. 97.) After holding that the CT-SORA violated the Due 
Process Clause, the court declined to address the ex post facto claim. (J.A. 96-97.) This Court 
granted certiorari on May 20, 2002. Conn. Dept, of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002).
2. Alaska Sex Offenders* Ex Post Facto Claim.
John Doe I and Doe II (“Doe I and 11”) are convicted sex offenders who reside in Alaska. 
(J.A. 111.) They initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and challenged the constitutionality of the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”), which the legislature enacted in 1994. (J.A.
111.) Doe I and II moved for a preliminary injunction to stop Alaska from collecting and 
disclosing sex offender information under ASORA. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372,1375 
(D. Alaska 1994). In addition, they moved for allowance to proceed under pseudonyms. Id.
The district court required Doe I and II to register under ASORA but prohibited the state from 
publicly disclosing the personal information. Id. at 1388, The court denied the use of 
pseudonyms. Id.
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Doe I and II appealed the denial of their use of pseudonyms, and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. (J.A. 200.) 
The district court dismissed the remanded complaint because Doe I and II refused to amend in 
their real names. (J.A. 200.) The court of appeals reversed the decision and allowed Doe I and 
II to continue with pseudonyms. (J.A. 201.)
In 1998, Doe I and II moved for summary judgment on all of their claims that ASORA 
violated federal and state constitutional rights. (J.A. 143, 144.) State defendants Ronald Otte, 
commissioner of the Alaska Department of Public Safety, and Bruce Botelho, Alaska’s attorney 
general, moved for partial summary judgment on, inter alia. Doe I and II’s claim that ASORA is 
an ex post facto law. (J.A. 139, 144.) The district court granted defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on the ex post facto claim and denied Doe I and II’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment on the same. (J.A. 185.) The district court dismissed Doe I and II’s claims 
that ASORA violated their federal due process rights. (J.A. 185.)
Doe I and II amended the complaint and moved for summary judgment on the claim that 
ASORA violates their due process rights. (J.A. 187.) The district court granted defendants’ 
cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissed Doe I and II’s complaint on the alleged due 
process violation. (J.A. 191.) The district court granted an injunction to keep Doe I and II’s 
registry information out of public records until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the 
case. (J.A. 194.)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2001, held that ASORA violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. (J.A. 222.) This Court granted certiorari. v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1126(2002).
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Statement of Facts
1. The Origin of Sexual Offender Registration Acts,
In 1989, a masked man kidnapped eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling near his home in St. 
Joseph, Minnesota. (J.A. 82.) Jacob’s family never saw him again. (J.A. 82.) In response to 
this tragedy, the federal government enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“the Wetterling Act”) in September of 1994.
Wayne A. Logan, A Study in '‘Actuarial Justice Sex Offender Classification Practice and 
Procedure, 3 Buff Crim. L. Rev. 593, 598 (2000). The Wetterling Act designates the minimum 
standards for state registration acts. Id. The Wetterling Act requires states to register offenders 
convicted of a criminal offense against a minor or a sexually violent offense. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(a)(1)(A) (2002). At a minimum, the Wetterling Act requires states to obtain sex 
offenders’ names, addresses, fingerprints, and photographs. Id. § 14071(b). The states may 
disclose the registry information for any purpose state law permits, and must disclose 
information necessary to protect the public. Id. § 14071(e). Additionally, states are free to 
broaden the list of offense categories, lengthen the mandated registration period, or impose more 
stringent measures designed to respond to each state’s individual needs. Logan, 3 Buff Crim. L. 
Rev. at 600. The federal government amended the Wetterling Act in 1996 and inserted the Pam 
Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act, which required the states to impose 
lifetime registration on certain offenders. Id.
On July 29, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas, a sexual offender with two prior convictions, 
sexually assaulted and murdered seven-year-old Megan Kanka. Ralph Siegel, Suspect Admits 
Killing Girl, 1 Record A1 (Aug. 2, 1994). Timmendequas invited Megan into his home, and 
subsequently sexually assaulted and murdered her. Id. Megan’s parents had no way of knowing
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(J.A. 81.) The legislation, coined “Megan’s Law,” required public officials to alert the public of 
convicted sexual offenders who lived in their communities. Subsequently, every state adopted a 
version of “Megan’s Law.” (J.A. 81.)
2. Connecticut’s Sexual Offender Registration Act.
Cormecticut’s version of “Megan’s Law,” the CT-SORA, requires people convicted of 
specified offenses to register with the CDPS after their release into the community. (J.A. 81.) 
The CT-SORA mandates registration of people convicted of (1) criminal offenses against a 
victim who is a minor, (2) nonviolent sexual offenses, (3) sexually violent offenses, and 
(4) felonies committed for a sexual purpose. (J.A. 81.) The registration period varies depending 
upon the type of offense. (J.A. 82.) A person convicted of a criminal offense against a minor or 
a nonviolent sexual offense must register for ten years. (J.A. 82.) The sentencing court also has 
discretion to require a person convicted of a felony committed for a sexual purpose to register for 
ten years. (J.A. 82.) A person convicted of a sexually violent offense must register for life.
(J.A. 82.) The CDPS has a procedure to respond to challenges to the accuracy of the registry 
information. (J.A. 30.)
Pursuant to the CT-SORA, the CDPS accumulates the information on sex offenders, and 
distributes it to local police departments, state police troops, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations. (J.A. 83.) The information is also available to all members of the public at the 
CDPS during business hours. (J.A. 83.) To effectively disseminate the information to members 
of the public who live in the sex offenders’ communities, Connecticut disclosed the information
that not just one, but three convicted sexual offenders lived just across the street. Siegel, 7
Record at A1. New Jersey passed legislation as a result of the outrage when residents discovered
that the state allowed convicted sexual offenders to live anonymously in their communities.
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through a website. (J.A. 83.) A statement on the website explained that the website’s purpose 
was to “facilitate access to publicly-available information about persons convicted of sexual 
offenses.” (J.A. 83.) The website also stated that Connecticut had not determined that any 
individual listed in the registry was currently dangerous. (J.A. 83.)
3. The Connecticut Respondents.
John Doe is a Connecticut resident who committed an offense specified in the CT-SORA. 
(J.A. 84.) Doe does not contend that any of his personal data listed in the CT-SORA is 
inaccurate. (J.A. 32.) Doe represents a certified class of all sex offenders who must register 
pursuant to the CT-SORA. (J.A. 84.)
4. Alaska’s Sexual Offender Registration Act.
In 1994, the state legislature passed the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, which 
requires convicted sex offenders to submit personal information for addition to a state sex 
offender registry available to law enforcement agencies and the public. (J.A. 212.) The 
legislature that passed the act faced a crisis: the nation’s highest rates of child sexual abuse.
(J.A. 213.) One-fourth of Alaska’s prison inmates had committed sexual offenses, and 100 sex 
offenders earned release into the community in 1993. (J.A. 212.)
The legislative findings at the beginning of ASORA declare that:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary government interest;
(3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less 
important than the government’s interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and 
the general public will assist in protecting the public safety.
Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (May 12, 1994). ASORA requires a sex offender to
complete a form with the offender’s name, address, place of employment, and other identifying
information. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(b)(1) (2001). In addition, the local police authority
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fingerprints and photographs the sex offender upon initial registration. Alaska Stat.
§ 12.63.010(b)(2).
Sex offenders convicted of aggravated or two or more sex offenses remain subject to the 
registration requirements for life, and verify registration information four times a year.
Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010(d)(2), 12.63.020(a)(1). Sex offenders convicted of a single sex 
offense or kidnapping register annually for 15 years. Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010(d)(1), 
12.63.020(a)(2).
Alaska makes the infonnation collected under ASORA available to law enforcement 
agencies and the public via the Internet. (J.A. 214.) The website provides visitors with the 
search tools to access an offender’s name, photograph, physical description, address, place of 
employment, and conviction information. (J.A. 214.)
5. The Alaska Respondents.
In 1985, Doe I plead nolo contendere to sexual abuse of a minor. (J.A. 212.) Doe I’s 
victim was his daughter, whom he abused while she was between the ages of nine and eleven. 
(J.A. 212.) Released from prison in 1990, Doe I received custody of his daughter after he 
convinced the court that his rehabilitation was successful. (J.A. 212.)
Doe II plead nolo contendere to sexual abuse of a minor in 1984. (J.A. 213.) His victim 
was 14 years old. (J.A. 213.) Doe II served eight years in prison and gained release in 1990. 
(J.A.213.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CT-SORA complies with the Due Process Clause because Connecticut did not 
defame the sex offenders and did not alter their legal status when it disclosed their true criminal 
histories. To establish a liberty deprivation based on injury to reputation, the sex offenders must
8
prove that Connecticut defamed them, and that this defamation altered or extinguished a right or 
status previously recognized by state law. Paul v. DaviSy 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Connecticut 
did not defame the sex offenders because it disclosed only true and accurate public information 
of the sex offenders’ criminal histories. The Connecticut website did not imply that any 
particular individual was currently dangerous because the group of sex offenders was large. 
Connecticut only listed individuals in the registry that a criminal court convicted of a sex 
offense. Connecticut disclosed the privileged criminal history data to protect the public.
Additionally, the alleged state action did not alter or impair the sex offenders’ legal status 
or benefits. The underlying offenses that the sex offenders committed, not a defamatory act by 
Connecticut, subjected them to the duty to register. The alleged plus factor, the duty to register, 
did not occur in the course of the alleged defamation as this Court requires. Connecticut has the 
power to impose affirmative duties that relate to public safety, which is a legitimate legislative 
objective. The registration duties do not constitute the plus factor required by this Court to 
establish a protected liberty interest.
Finally, the circumstances do not warrant additional procedural safeguards. Connecticut 
has compelling interests to protect the public and conserve scarce fiscal resources. An additional 
hearing would serve no purpose because sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and it is 
impossible to predict who will re-offend. Members of the public have a right to receive 
information that will permit them to safeguard their children. States do not have the resources to 
conduct individual assessments of each offender’s risk of re-offense. These factors evidence that 
this Court should not require a hearing.
Similar to the CT-SORA, ASORA simply collects and discloses public information, 
without punishing sex offenders. Therefore, ASORA falls outside the ex post facto prohibition
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of the Constitution. The Alaska legislature enacted ASORA in order to help the public protect 
itself and to help the police apprehend crimes, both of which are civil goals. In addition, the 
statute’s effect is regulatory, and not so punitive as to negate the civil intent of the legislature. 
Specifically, ASORA does not disable or restrain sex offenders. Also, the state’s role to disclose 
public information is not traditionally viewed as punishment. In addition, ASORA does not 
promote retribution or deterrence, but instead rationally relates to the non-punitive purpose of 
protecting the public. When taken in the context of the daunting problem of recidivism among 
sex offenders and the statute’s purpose to protect people, the ASORA features are not excessive. 
Any evidence of punitive effects measures far below the clearest proof required to override the 
legislature’s civil intent.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CONNECTICUT SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT COMPLIES
WITH DUE PROCESS BECAUSE CONNECTICUT DISCLOSES ONLY TRUE AND 
ACCURATE INFORMATION, WHICH DOES NOT ALTER OR IMPAIR THE SEX 
OFFENDERS’ LEGAL STATUS.
Connecticut posts true and accurate information on the Internet regarding the sex 
offenders’ criminal histories. This accurate information does not impair or alter the sex 
offenders’ legal status, but merely offers the public easier access to already public information.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of liberty does not protect a person’s reputation 
alone. Paul v. Davis^ 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). To prevail on the due process claim, the sex 
offenders must prove (1) that Connecticut defamed them, and (2) that “as a result of the state 
action complained of,’’ Connecticut altered or extinguished a right or status previously 
recognized by state law. Id. at 712. Lower courts that apply the test from Paul v. Davis refer to 
it as the “stigma-plus” test or the “defamation-plus” test because the first prong requires proof of
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the elements of defamation. WMX Techs. Inc. v. Miller^ 80 F.3d 1315,1319 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash~Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999).
A. Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders as required by the defamation prong
of the Paul v, Davis test when it disclosed true criminal histories to the public.
The sex offenders must prove that Connecticut defamed them when it disclosed their 
convictions to the public. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09; Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991). 
Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders because it disclosed only true information,, which it 
had privilege to disclose. Connecticut was not negligent when it determined the criminal history 
data was true because a criminal court convicted all of the sex offenders. The Respondents are 
unable to prove all of the elements of defamation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 
(1977) (providing the elements of defamation: (1) false statement about another person,
(2) published without privilege, (3) fault of at least negligence by the publisher, and 
(4) actionable without special harm or the existence of special hann).
1. Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders because it disclosed only 
true and accurate information that was already available to the public.
The CT-SORA website allows the public easier access to public information regarding 
sex offenders’ criminal histories. (J.A. 83.) The slated purpose of the website was to “facilitate 
access to publicly-available information about persons convicted of sexual offenses.” (J.A. 83.) 
As part of Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act, even information regarding arrests is 
public information. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-215(a) (2001) (“[A]ny record of the arrest of any 
person .. . shall be a public record from the time of such arrest.”). This Court has struck down 
statutes in the past that kept the truth from the public. Va. St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (criticizing a state law that prohibited certain 
truthful advertising as “highly paternalistic”).
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An individual who publishes a true statement is not liable for defamation. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 581 A. Specifically, section 581 A(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
states that “[i]f the defamatory statement is a specific allegation of the commission of a particulat^ 
crime, the statement is true if the plaintiff did commit that crime.” Id. § 581 A(c). A statement 
that an individual committed a specific crime is not defamatory if the individual did commit that 
crime. Id.
The Connecticut sex offender registry website correctly stated that the listed individuals 
committed sexual offenses. (J.A. 83.) The first page of the website emphasized that Connecticut 
included offenders in the registry “solely by virtue of their conviction record.” (J.A. 83.) The 
sex offenders listed in the registry plead guilty, plead nolo contendere, or a jury or court found 
them guilty of a sex and/or violent offense in a criminal proceeding. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-250 
(2001). All of this information was a matter of public record. (J.A. 83.) The statement 
accurately portrayed the sex offenders’ criminal histories because all of the individuals actually 
committed the crimes according to the standards of the U.S. criminal justice system.
The case law of this Court also recognizes that a state violates due process only where it 
is possible that the information disclosed is false. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the 
unconstitutional Wisconsin statute allowed the chief of police to post a notice in liquor stores 
that forbade the sale of alcohol to certain individuals who became dangerous after consuming 
alcohol. 400 U.S. 433, 434—35 (1971). The chief of police alone decided which individuals to 
include in the notice. Id. This Court expressed fear that without any sort of prior hearing the 
individual “may have been the victim of an official’s caprice” and for this reason, held that the 
statute violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 437. Wisconsin had to hold a hearing to 
determine the truth of the charges prior to posting individuals’ names. Id. This Court requires a
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hearing when the public actor is uncertain of the truth of the information. See e.g. Goss v. Lopez^ 
419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (requiring public schools to hold a hearing prior to suspending students 
from school to determine if the misconduct charges are true); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 
(1971) (requiring Georgia to first determine if the individual was liable for the motor accident 
before it revoked the individual’s driver’s license); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 
(1972) (requiring states to hold a hearing to determine whether the individual violated his parole 
conditions before it altered the individual’s parole status).
Cormecticut only disclosed accurate criminal history data. Connecticut designated 
Respondents as convicted sexual offenders on the website because a criminal court convicted 
them of a sexual offense. (J.A. 82.) Connecticut did not make a discretionary judgment to affix 
the label of convicted sex offender on Respondents as was the case in Constantineau. (J.A. 82.) 
Connecticut did not attach a false label to Respondents because the label derives from their 
accurate criminal histories.
2. The Connecticut sex offender registry website disclosed public criminal 
history information and did not single out any particular sex offender as 
currently dangerous.
The sex offender registry did not disclose any individualized message of danger. The 
meaning of a communication is “that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, 
understands [the communication] intended to express.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563. 
The Connecticut sex offender website contained a statement that the CDPS had not determined 
that any individual included in the registry was currently dangerous. (J.A. 83.) The website also 
stated that its purpose was to allow members of the public to easily access the public 
information, and not to warn that any particular individuals were dangerous. (J.A. 83.) In light
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Defamation requires that the recipient of the defamatory matter understands the matter 
applies to a particular individual. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A (1977). For this 
reason, an individual does not defame anyone where the message sent regards a large group of 
people. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that defamation requires that (1) the 
group is small enough that the recipient can reasonably understand the matter to refer to a 
particular individual, or (2) the circumstances reasonably conclude that the matter refers to a 
particular individual. Id. A publisher does not defame a particular individual when it publishes 
defamatory statements regarding a large group. Id.
Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders even if it implied that they are dangerous 
because the sex offender registry contains a large number of people. As of April 2001, the 
Connecticut registry website listed 2,030 individuals as convicted sex offenders. U.S. Dept, of 
Justice, Summary of State Sex Offender Registries, p. 14 <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/sssor 01st.pdf> (last updated Mar. 29, 2002). The website did not contain any statement that 
any particular individual was currently dangerous and there were no other circumstances that 
suggested any particular individual was more dangerous. (J.A. 83.) Connecticut did not defaiUe 
the sex offenders because the registry group was too large to imply that any particular individual 
was dangerous.
3. Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders because it did not act 
negligently when it disclosed accurate criminal history information.
of these statements, it was not reasonable for the public to believe that all of the individuals listed
were dangerous, and the website did not single out any individual as a particular danger.
This Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that the states may not impose liability
without fault for defamation. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that the publisher of information is only liable if he knew the statement was false, acted in
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reckless disregard of the falsity, or acted negligently in failing to determine whether the 
disseminated information is false. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B. The lowest standard 
of fault that gives rise to defamation is negligence. Id.
Connecticut was not knowing, reckless, or negligent in disclosing the accurate criminal 
history data. As mentioned previously, a criminal court convicted all of the individuals listed in 
the Connecticut sex offender registry of one of the four offenses listed in the CT-SORA. (J.A. 
82.) Connecticut did not list individuals in the registry who it merely believed committed sexual 
offenses. (J.A. 82.) Connecticut established the sex offenders’ guilt “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” prior to listing them in the sex offender registry. Additionally, the CDPS had a procedure 
in place to respond to any protests regarding the accuracy of the information in the registry.
(J.A. 30.) For this reason, Connecticut was not at fault as required for defamation.
4. Connecticut did not defame the sex offenders because it had privilege to 
disclose the accurate criminal history information for the safety of the 
public.
Connecticut had privilege to disclose the true and accurate criminal history to the public. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a publication is not defamatory if the publisher 
has privilege to disclose the matter. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b). Where the law 
requires the publication, the publisher has absolute privilege. Id. § 592A. Conditional privilege 
exists where it is necessary to disclose the information to protect the interest of the publisher or 
the recipient. Id. §§ 594, 595. Conditional privilege bars liability for defamation as long as the 
publisher does not abuse the privilege. Id. § 593. Comment (g) to section 595 specifically states 
that the publisher has privilege if the publication is “made to the person whose life or property is 
in peril... since there is a social justification for reasonable efforts to protect anyone.” Id.
§ 595, comment (g).
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Connecticut had privilege to disclose the true information to protect the public welfare. 
The United States legislature enacted the Wetterling Act, which requires the states to disclose to 
the public information about convicted sex offenders living in their communities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(e) (2002). In response, Connecticut enacted the CT-SORA, which requires the CDPS to 
disclose sex offenders’ criminal histories. (J.A. 83.) Both the state and federal legislatures 
concluded that sex offenders continue to pose a risk to society upon their release into the 
community because of their high rate of recidivism. Connecticut releases this information to 
allow the individuals living near sex offenders to protect their children in the event that the sex 
offender plans to re-offend. (J.A. 84.) Connecticut has privilege to publish the information 
because its sole purpose is to protect vulnerable citizens. Connecticut acted within its police 
power when it disclosed sex offender information to the public. Jacobson v. Mass.^ 197 U.S. lU 
25 (1905) (“According to settled principles the police power of a state must... embrace, at least, 
such reasonable regulations ... as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
B. Connecticut did not alter or impair the sex offenders’ legal status when it
disclosed the true and accurate information to protect the public.
Even if Connecticut defamed the sex offenders, there is still no protected liberty interest 
because there was no plus factor. This Court stated in Paul v. Davis that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as 
employment.” 424 U.S. at 702. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
stated prior to hearing the present case that the meaning of the plus element is ambiguous. 
Valmonte v. Bane^ 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994). This Court explained in Siegert v. Gilley 
that the plus factor requires that the defamation impair a more tangible government benefit, such 
as government employment, or impose a legal disability, such as the loss of the right to purchase 
liquor. 500 U.S. at 240.
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The sex offenders did not prove that as a result of the defamatory action, they lost 
government employment or became legally disabled. The sex offenders alleged that the plus 
factor in this case was the new set of registration duties that if not followed would result in a 
felony. Connecticut’s disclosure of the sex offender registry did not cause this alleged plus 
factor. The federal and Connecticut laws placed the registration duties on the sex offenders prior 
to disclosing the accurate criminal history. The minimal burdens placed on the sex offenders 
were within Connecticut’s power as the guardian of public safety. All individuals face the 
prospect of a felony conviction for breaking a law.
1. The sex offenders, not an act by Connecticut, caused the alleged plus 
factor because they committed the underlying offense, which subjected 
them to registration duties.
The defamation by the state must directly cause the occurrence of the plus factor. In Paul v. 
Davis, this Court held that the state must alter or extinguish a right or status previously 
recognized under state law “as a result of the [defamatory] state action.” 424 U.S. at 701. The 
words “as a result of’ indicate that the defamatory state action complained of must actually cause 
the plus element.
The cause of the alleged plus factor, the duty to register, is the underlying sexual and/or 
violent crime that the sex offenders committed. The alleged defamation by Connecticut did not 
cause the registration duties imposed by the CT-SORA. Pursuant to the federal requirements of 
42 U.S.C. § 14071 and the CT-SORA, it was the underlying sexual and/or violent offense that 
was the actual cause of the registration duties. Connecticut enacted the website to allow 
members of the public to take precautions to prevent tragedies, such as the sexual assault and 
murder of Megan Kanka. If the sex offenders had not committed the underlying offense, 
Connecticut would not have required them to register. Connecticut did not cause the alleged plus
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factor because it was caused by the sexual and/or violent offense committed by the offenders. 
The alleged plus factor fails to meet this Court’s causation requirement.
2. The alleged plus element did not occur in the course of Connecticut 
disclosing the information to the public.
The plus element must occur in the course of the stigma. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234. In 
Siegert, the petitioner, a clinical psychologist, agreed to resign from a government position at a 
hospital after the hospital notified him that it wanted to terminate his employment. Id. at 227. 
After Siegert’s new government employer received a defamatory letter from Siegert’s former 
employer, he denied Seigert his credentials. Id. at 228. As a result, the new employer turned 
down Siegert for a certain position. Id. This Court held that Siegert had failed to state a claim 
for a liberty interest violation, because the plus element, impairment of employment prospects, 
did not occur incidentally with the defamation. Id. at 234.
In this case, the alleged plus factor, the registration duties imposed by the CT-SORA, did 
not occur in the course of the alleged defamation, the public disclosure of the information. 
According to the CT-SORA, a convicted offender must register within three days after their 
release into the community. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251 (2001). The CDPS does not use the 
information to protect the people of the community until after the offender fulfills his registration 
duties. Although the offender must verify or resubmit information to ensure accuracy, the 
registration duties do not occur concurrently with the slate’s release of information. Connecticut 
only imposes a felony offense on the sex offenders if they breach the registration duties. This 
element of the plus factor included in the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circtiit 
also does not occur in the course of Connecticut disclosing the accurate criminal history data.
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3. The Connecticut sex offender registry did not cause the loss of 
government employment for the sex offenders.
This Court has primarily found that a plus element existed in cases where the state terminates 
the defamed individual’s government employment. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, this Court attempted to define under what circumstances injury to reputation would 
implicate a liberty interest. 408 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1972). The Respondent in Roth asserted a 
liberty deprivation where his government employer refused to renew his employment contract.
Id. at 566. This Court recognized that there is a liberty deprivation where there is loss of 
government employment along with damaging charges to the individual’s reputation made by the 
state. Id. at 573. Later, in Siegert, this Court held that there was no liberty interest because the 
public actor did not utter the defamation incident to terminating Siegert’s government 
employment. 500 U.S. at 234. Justice Marshall criticized the majority view that “reputational 
injury deprives a person of liberty only when combined with loss of present employment, not 
future employment.” Id. at 572-73. This Court has seldom found the existence of a plus 
element outside of the government employment arena.
The sex offenders did not allege the loss of present government employment caused by the 
stigma. The alleged plus factor, the registration duties, is not similar to the archetypal factor of 
government employment. This Court recognized employment’s importance to the livelihood of 
an individual and chose to specifically protect the loss of government employment caused by 
defamation. The duties of registration do not impair the sex offenders’ ability to perform any 
job. The sex offenders have not established a plus factor because the CT-SORA did not cause 
the loss of government employment or impair a similar tangible interest.
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4. Connecticut has the power to impose registration duties on the sex
offenders because the duties relate to the legitimate legislative objective to 
protect the public.
The government has the power to impose regulatory constraints or affirmative duties on the 
rights protected by the Due Process Clause. U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985); See also 
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (noting that the government may subject “persons and property ... to 
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity 
of the state.”). In Locke, this Court upheld the constitutionality of annual filing requirements that 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 imposes on holders of unpatented mining 
claims. Id. at 109-10. The Act requires claim holders to register their claims initially and every 
subsequent year with the Bureau of Land Management. Id. at 88. Claim holders’ failure to file 
the required information results in forfeiture of their property rights. Id. at 86. This Court 
emphasized that where the duties propose to further legitimate legislative objectives, the 
legislature acts within its power. Id. at 104. The legislature does not have to enact the most 
desirable way to meet the legislative objective, but only a rational way. Id. at 109.
In this case, the registration requirements for sexual offenders resemble those upheld in 
Locke, and the legislature has an even more compelling objective furthered by the sex offender 
registration duties. The vested property rights examined in Locke are similar to the liberty 
interest examined in this case because the Fourteenth Amendment protects both. The CT-SOB^ 
requires convicted sex offenders to provide certain information shortly after their release into the 
community, and requires them to verify the information to ensure accuracy. (J.A. 82.) Failure to 
complete the requirements may result in imprisonment. (J.A. 83.) This is similar to the act 
upheld in Locke because failure to submit the required information in that case resulted in a loss 
of property rights. The Connecticut legislature has a legitimate objective to provide the public
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the opportunity to protect their children from convicted sex ofienders who live in their 
communities. The public disclosure of information via a website is a rational scheme for 
meeting this objective because it effectively provides the needed information to members of the 
community. According to the holding in Locke, the Connecticut legislature has the power to 
enact the registration duties, which are therefore not a plus factor for purposes of the 
“defamation-plus” test.
The sex offenders’ legal status is the same as all other individuals. Connecticut requires 
them to register because they committed one of the offenses listed in the CT-SORA. Failure to 
complete their duty to register results in a class D felony. (J.A. 83.) This Court may consider 
the untiered system and the felony charge for failing to complete the registration duties harsh, but 
the legislature has the power to enact harsh legislation. See Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957 
(1991) (holding that a Michigan statute that allowed life imprisonment for cocaine possessors 
was constitutional). Like the sex offenders, any individual that breaks a law is subject to the 
penalty provided by the legislature.
C. An additional hearing would serve no purpose because of the difficulty in
predicting recidivism, the low risk of erroneous deprivation, and the compelling
state interest.
The circumstances do not require procedural due process because Coimecticut did not 
deprive the sex offenders of a protected liberty interest. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569. If this Court 
finds, however, that a protected liberty interest exists, the circumstances still do not warrant a 
hearing. This Court examines three factors to determine what process is due: (1) the private 
interest the state affects, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest and the 
probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the 
administrative burden. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35. (1976). This Court balances
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The sole private interest asserted is the alleged liberty interest of the sex offenders 
required to register. Connecticut does not risk erroneous deprivation because a criminal court 
convicted all the sex offenders of a sexual and/or violent crime in a criminal proceeding. (J.A. 
82.) All offenders included in the registry plead guilty, plead nolo contendere, or a jury or court 
found them guilty. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251. The standard of proof required to convict a 
person in a criminal proceeding is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is a higher standard than 
administrative hearings. Additionally, Connecticut has a procedure in place to respond to 
challenges of the accuracy of the registry information. (J.A. 30.)
An administrative hearing would have no value because it is impossible to predict which 
offenders will recidivate. Sex offenders are more likely to re-offend with sex and/or violent 
crimes than other repeat offenders. Doe v. PoritZy 142 N.J. 1, 17(1995). The propensity to 
commit another sexual crime does not go away with time. Id. The statistical evidence suggests 
that child sexual offenders especially are serial offenders. James A. Billings & Crystal L. 
Bulges, Maine's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Wise or Wicked'f 52 Me. L. 
Rev. 175, 186 (2000). One study concluded that the “behavior [of sexual offenders] is highly 
repetitive, to the point of compulsion” after the study found that 74% of imprisoned child sex 
offenders had one or more prior conviction. Id. A National Institute of Mental Health study 
determined that the typical child sexual offender molests 117 children, most of whom do not 
report the offense. Id. at n. 84. The average number of victims for a molester of young boys is 
even higher at 281 children per offender. Id. Further, successful treatment of sex offenders is 
rare. Poritz, 142 N.J. at 17. With rates of recidivism this high and the result of re-offense so
these factors to determine “when, under our constitutional system, [it must impose] judicial-typo
procedures.” Mathews^ 424 U.S. at 348.
22
damaging to the child victims, it is better to err on the side of our children. A hearing would 
serve no value in determining which of the released sexual offenders may recidivate.
Connecticut, as guardian of the public safety, has a strong interest in protecting children 
from sexual abuse and violent crime. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746, 766 (1982). Sex 
offender registry acts represent a determination by the legislature that society has a right to know 
of the presence of sexual offenders in their communities to allow people to protect themselves 
and their children. Poritz, 142N.J.atl3. The sex offender registry acts also represent a 
conclusion, based on statistical data, that re-offense by sexual offenders is a serious risk. Id.
The sheer number of sexual crimes represents a need for Connecticut to protect its 
citizens from sexual offenders. Although many people do not report sexual crimes, the available 
data demonstrates the large scale of the problem. Id. at 16. The United States Justice 
Department indicates that each year in the United States about 133,000 women age twelve or 
older fall victim to rape or attempted rape. Id. Additionally, the Justice Department estimates 
from police reports that offenders raped around 17,000 girls under the age of twelve in 1992. Id.
Sexual crimes against children leave a lasting scar on the victims as well as society. 
Adults molested as children are more prone to develop psychosocial problems, including chronic 
depression and anxiety, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and involvement in sexually or 
physically abusive relationships. Id. Child sexual abuse often unleashes a chain where the 
victims become the aggressors against their own children. Id. Studies show a close link between 
adult male aggressive behavior and childhood sexual abuse. Id. All of these problems connected 
to sexual abuse take a toll on society in the form of the fiscal burden of treatment, and the 
continuing spiral of sexual crime that takes tomorrow’s children as its victims. Connecticut’s
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interest in lessening sexual crime is greater than the private interests of convicted sex ofienders 
because of the personal trauma and societal damage caused by sexual crimes.
To require a pre-registration hearing would impose a great administrative and fiscal 
burden on Connecticut. The government’s interest in conserving scarce monetary resources is a 
factor considered in determining what process is due. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348. This Court 
emphasized in Mathews that “[a]t some point [the cost may outweigh] the benefit of an 
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action.” Id. Connecticut’s 
scarce resources should go to protecting the children of communities where convicted sexual 
offenders reside, and not to a superfluous hearing.
The factors in this case weigh against additional procedural safeguards. A criminal court 
convicted the sex offenders subject to registration in criminal proceedings, which established 
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut has a strong interest to protect the children in 
communities where a convicted offender resides and to conserve scarce fiscal resources. These 
interests outweigh the sex offenders’ alleged liberty interest. Even more compelling, a pre- 
registration hearing would serve no purpose because it is impossible to predict who will re­
offend.
II. THE MEASURES USED BY THE ALASKA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY TO 
COLLECT AND DISCLOSE INFORMATION FALL OUTSIDE THE EX POST 
FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE THEY MAP THE LEGISLATURE’S REGULATORY 
INTENT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC.
ASORA is not an ex post facto law because it does not retroactively punish sex offender.^ 
ASORA requires sex offenders to simply register with local authorities and allows Alaska to 
passively disclose the registry information to concerned members of the public. On its face, the 
Alaska statute evidences its civil, non-punitive nature. Neither the language of the statute nor its 
placement indicates a criminal nature. The legislative findings that precede ASORA spell out
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the Alaska legislature’s intent to help the public protect itself and to help police agencies 
apprehend sex offenders, not to disadvantage sex offenders.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the legislative intent of 
ASORA is non-punitive. Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). The court considered 
whether Respondents proved that ASORA so punishes sex offenders that it is criminal in effect 
despite the legislature’s civil intent. Id, at 994. The court applied the Kennedy seven-factor 
balancing test and held that ASORA punishes sex offenders and therefore violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. Id. In particular, the court held that ASORA proves excessive because Alaska 
publishes public information about sex offenders on the Internet. Id.
The Ninth Circuit gave too much weight to a single feature of ASORA—how Alaska 
discloses information on the Internet—and too much weight to a single factor of the seven-part 
Kennedy test—whether ASORA’s measures are excessive in light of the legislature’s intent to 
protect Alaskan citizens. The sex offenders have not come forward with the “clearest proof’ of 
ASORA’s criminal effects, which this Court requires to overcome the legislature’s stated purpose 
for ASORA. U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). This Court recognizes that the choice 
among reasonable policy alternatives remains with the government officials who have unique 
understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources. Mich. Dept, of St. Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990). The Ninth Circuit imposed its own ideals on the disclosure 
system instead of strictly judging whether ASORA is excessive in light of the Alaska 
legislature’s intent to protect its citizens.
De novo review of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion begins with what it means to retroactively 
punish people. The U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
The clause has two purposes. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). First, individuals
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receive fair warning about the effects of the laws that govern them. IVeaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29. 
Second, the clause provides a judicial check against state legislatures that pass arbitrary and 
vindictive laws. Id.
Alaska denies sex offenders fair notice and the legislation is vindictive only if ASORA 
punishes offenders more than the law allowed when the offenders committed the sex crimes. U. 
ASORA does not punish offenders more or change the terms of the offenses, and the act does not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
This Court has established a two-part test to determine when a law is civil. Ward, 448 
U.S. at 248; Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144,169 (1963). First, this Court asks whether the legislature intended a civil law, either 
expressly or implicitly. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. Second, this Court decides whether the movant 
has shown the “clearest proof* that the law is so punitive in effect that it overrides the 
legislature’s civil intent. Id. at 249.
A. ASORA is a civil law because it collects and discloses details about sex
offenders* residences and workplaces to help the public protect itself, not to
punish offenders.
Courts decide whether a law is civil based on the face of the statute and the legislative 
process behind it. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248; Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. If the legislature labels a 
statute as “civil,” that ends the inquiry. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. Otherwise, courts look to 
whether the legislature implied a civil intent. Id.
This Court has looked extensively to the legislative debates behind a statute to determine 
whether Congress intended to punish individuals. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 171-85. In Kennedy^ 
the congressional debates revealed that both the opponents and the proponents of the statutory 
language spoke of the purpose of the bill as a “’penalty* and ‘punishment* for a ‘crime* and an
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‘offense’ and a ‘violation’ of ‘criminal law.’” Kennedy^ 372 U.S. at 174. This Court decided 
that the legislature’s intent to punish individuals was clear through these debates. Id. at 169.
Here, the Alaska legislature did not label the acts as criminal or civil, so the inquiry is whether 
the legislature implied one or the other.
The legal codes under which the legislature placed ASORA indicates administrative 
preference rather than whether the law is civil or criminal. The Alaska legislature placed the 
laws that require offenders to register in the criminal procedure code and the laws that require 
Alaska to disclose public information in the civil administration code. Alaska Slat.
§§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (2001). The legislature placed the registration laws in the criminal 
procedure code for administrative convenience because they apply to persons who have 
committed sex offenses. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. The criminal procedure code includes several 
statutes that are civil in nature, such as how Alaska appoints medical examiners and fingerprints 
individuals. Alaska Stat. §§ 12.65.015,12.80.060(2001). The legislature placed the ASORA 
provisions for administrative convenience, not to signal whether the laws are civil or criminal.
The structure of ASORA reveals the civil intent of the legislature. The law requires sex 
offenders to do no more than supply basic information to the Department of Corrections at 
regular intervals. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. The Department of Corrections must provide this 
public information to law enforcement officers and those in the public who seek out the 
information. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087.
The structure of ASORA maps the civil intent of Alaska’s lawmakers. The legislative 
findings that appear at the beginning of ASORA plainly state the purpose of the statute. The 
Alaska legislature intended to protect the public from sex offenders through the release of public 
information. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (May 12,1994). ASORA effectuates this
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goal when it releases certain information about sex offenders to police agencies and interested 
members of the public. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. at § 1. The legislature recognized Ih^ 
privacy interests of sex offenders, but concluded that they are less important here than Alaska’s 
need to protect its citizens. Id. The legislature decided that the provisions could lawfully 
impinge on sex offenders’ privacy rights without punishing the sex offenders. Id. The structure 
of ASORA evidences the intent of the Alaska’s legislature to regulate but not punish offenders.
The legislature made the Alaska sex offender registry a regulatory mechanism to collect 
and disclose sex offender information for public safety. The sex offenders claim that ASORA is 
so punitive in effect that it overrides the legislature’s civil intent. This Court applies the sevens 
{zcXor Kennedy test to decide whether the sex offenders have shown the “clearest proof’ that the 
law punishes offenders. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169; Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
B. ASORA is a civil law in effect because the seven-factor Kennedy test shows thai
the law regulates rather than punishes sex offenders and that ASORA’s measures
rationally and proportionately relate to public safety.
This Court has instmeted lower courts to apply a seyen-faclor test to detennine whether 
an act of the legislature is civil or criminal in effect. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. ASORA 
(1) does not impose an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) does not impose a sanction that is 
viewed historically as a punishment; (3) does not attach based on knowledge of wrongdoing;
(4) does not promote retribution and deterrence; (5) does not apply to criminal behavior;
(6) rationally relates to a public safety purpose; and (7) proves not excessive in relation to the 
public safety purpose. Id. at 168-69.
All of the factors are relevant and may point in different directions, and no one factor 
controls the outcome. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101. Courts do not need to examine all seven factors, 
as evidenced in Hudson, where this Court only considered the five factors more applicable to ilic 
statute. Id. at 104-05. Courts evaluate a statute by the totality of the circumstances and decide
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whether the movants produce the “clearest proof’ that the statute punishes offenders in fact, 
Hudson^ 522 U.S. at 105.
The Kennedy factors test applies to ASORA on its face. 372 U.S. at 169. For example, 
this Court examined whether the sanction in Hudson came into play only on the basis of scienter 
and found that the statute on its face penalized violators, without regard to the violator’s state of 
mind. 522 U.S. at 104. This Court limits itself to the express language of the statute to 
determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature. Id. The seven Kennedy factors add up to 
show here that ASORA is civil in effect.
1. ASORA does not disable or restrain sex offenders.
The Alaska statute does not disable or restrain sex offenders because it simply requires 
sex offenders to submit information at regular intervals. Although this Court has not defined the 
terms affirmative disability or restraint, this Court in Hudson interprets the terms to involve the 
“’infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” 522 U.S. at 104. Inthe sanctioned 
offenders could not subsequently participate in their profession, the banking industry, and this 
Court found the sanction far short of an affirmative disability or restraint. Id.
Here, the requirement that sex offenders visit a local authority at specified intervals and 
update their contact and employment information does not restrain offenders. Alaska Stat. 
§12.63.010. Sex offenders may move and travel freely. Id. ASORA provides the public with 
information on where the sex offenders work, but that alone does not disable or restrain their 
employment opportunities. The sex offenders may work where they wish. If employers 
discriminate against sex offenders on the basis of their previous offenses and/or their presence on 
the registration lists, appropriate employment laws exist to address the individuals who hire or 
fire discriminatorily. See 2-28 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 28.05 (2001) (noting
29
that courts favor a plaintiff when an employer refuses to hire, or fires, an individual based on 
prior criminal convictions, unless the previous criminal acts directly apply to the job duties).
2. The information ASORA collects and discloses to protect its citizens is 
not historically viewed as punishment.
Among the seven factors, the historical view factor applies less here. This Court’s 
historical view of punishment sanctions does not extend to the duty of sex offenders to register 
and Alaska’s power to disclose public information. The Alaska government’s action to collect 
and disclose public information compares to the historical rights and duties of individuals to 
disclose public information under other laws, which the court system encourages or even 
mandates.
The United States legal system does not allow anonymity: the government publicly 
indicts and tries defendants, the media covers trials, and legal procedure rules require the use of 
one’s own name in a claim. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (2001). Local authorities and 
concerned citizens could otherwise obtain, through public records, the information that ASORA 
provides on listed sex offenders. The Alaska statute allows the passive disclosure of public 
information, which is not historically viewed as punishment.
3. ASORA requires sex offenders to register and Alaska to disclose public 
information regardless of knowledge of wrongdoing.
On its face, the Alaska statute applies to all sex offenders, without regard to knowledge. 
In Hudson, an agency could assess penalties against any person who violated the statute, without 
regard to the violator’s state of mind. 522 U.S. at 104. Since the sanction came into play 
whether or not a court found scienter, this Court decided that the third Kennedy factor suggested 
that the law did not punish offenders, but rather regulated them.
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Here, the Alaska statute blankets all sex offenders. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. To 
evaluate the convictions that label someone a sex offender for the purposes of ASORA would 
violate the rule that courts test a statute on its face. Hudson^ 522 U.S. at 104. Even if this Court 
looks to the underlying crimes of the sex offenders, some apply without any mens rea. Alaska 
Stat. § 12.63.100 (2001). As ASORA uses the term, sex offense includes acts with minors that 
are illegal whether or not the offender knows the minor’s age, and also includes convicts who 
plead nolo contendere and who the jury acquitted by reason of mental illness. Id. This third 
Kennedy factor also points toward a non-punitive effect.
4. ASORA promotes public safety, not the traditional aims of punishment— 
retribution and deterrence.
The Alaska legislature passed ASORA to promote public safety, not to punish or deter 
sex offenders. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1. Courts examine all of the elements already 
addressed by the other six Kennedy factors to decide whether a statute involves retribution, or 
punishment. Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-66 (1997).
In Hendricks, this Court analyzed the other six factors to decide whether a statute that 
subjects a person to non-indefmite confinement serves as retribution. Id. at 365-66. The 
Hendricks statute allowed the government to confine sexually violent predators past their 
scheduled release from prison. Id. at 352. This Court decided that the Hendricks statute was not 
retributive because the government used the conviction record to serve as evidence rather than to 
affix culpability. In Allen v. Illinois, this Court found a statute non-punitive even though it was 
applied based on an offender’s sexual crime because Illinois used the prior criminal conduct 
primarily to predict future behavior. 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986).
Here, the Alaska statute uses sex offenders’ prior convictions as information to help 
protect the public, not as an indication of present culpability. ASORA focuses on the offenders’
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prior crimes as grounds for possible recidivism. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Scss. § 1.
ASORA’s civil use of the criminal history evidences the non-retributive nature of the statute.
In Hendricks, this Court decided that the legislature did not intend the statute to deter 
wrongdoers and the Court doubted that the statute even could deter people. 521 U.S. at 362-63. 
This Court reasoned that the statute only affected people who suffer from mental abnormalities 
that deprive them of control over their behavior, and it is unlikely that the threat of confinement 
deters such persons. Id.
The Alaska legislature structured ASORA to inform the public and the police, not to 
deter recidivism. ASORA provides information for the public to protect themselves and the 
police to apprehend recidivists. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1. ASORA’s actual ability 
to affect recidivism rates is questionable. Even if ASORA allows law enforcement agents to 
apprehend sexual offenders more effectively or more quickly than before, the statute is not likely 
to deter offenders. If potential prison sentences fail to deter prospective offenders, they are not 
likely to reconsider based on the threat of the registration and disclosure requirements.
5. ASORA applies to an offender’s status, not to behavior that is already a 
crime.
ASORA applies to sex offenders who gain release from prison and re-enter the 
community, and ASORA does not apply to their behavior after release, unless they fail to 
register. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. If this Court looks at the underlying behavior that leads to the 
sex offender status, then ASORA applies to criminal behavior. Id. This fifth Kennedy factor 
cuts both ways, depending on whether this Court looks to the status or the underlying crime as 
the basis on which ASORA applies to offenders.
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6. ASORA rationally relates to a non-punitive purpose because the 
legislature enacted ASORA to protect the public.
Parents use the ASORA information to remain on guard for sex offenders’ suspicious 
behavior toward their children. Police agencies use the information to update the databases that 
help them apprehend re-offenders. Sex offender registration acts with these two functions help 
protect the public. Alaska H. 69, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1. After a repeat sex offender who lived 
next door to seven-year-old Megan Kanka brutally murdered her, the New Jersey legislature 
enacted the first “Megan’s Law.” Doe v. Dept, of Pub. Safety., 271 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2001). 
The federal government recognized the tremendous threat to all states because sex offenders re­
offend at a high rate and encouraged all states to collect and disclose information about resident 
sex offenders to help the public help themselves. Id. Alaska, along with all the other states, 
tailored a system to collect and disclose sex offender information that suits the Alaska public’s 
and law enforcement agencies’ needs. Id.
The Alaska legislature’s design to protect its citizens connects to the tangible effects of 
ASORA. First, ASORA allows concerned parents to access information about sex offenders in 
their neighborhood and to make more informed decisions on how to protect their children. 
Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087. Second, ASORA prepares law enforcement agencies with more 
accurate information about sex offenders to help police apprehend re-offenders. Id. ASORA’s 
features give effect to the legislature’s intent to protect the public.
7. ASORA’s features, which allow Alaska to collect and disclose public 
information, are not excessive because they rationally and proportionately 
relate to the legislature’s goal to protect the public and Alaska’s uniquely 
high rate of sex offenses.
If ASORA appears to take more excessive steps to collect and disclose sex offender 
information it is because Alaska faces a crisis unseen in any other state. Alaska has one of the
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highest rates of child sexual abuse in the nation and one-quarter of its prison population 
committed sex offenses. (J.A. 212.) Other states have chosen other methods to collect and 
disclose sex offender information. New York, for example, ranks recidivism threat levels and 
uses a tiered system to decide the amount of sex offender infonnation that New York discloses to 
the public. NY Correct. Law § 168 (McKinney 2002). The forty-nine other stales face different 
sex offense rates than New York, and different budgetary constraints and law enforcement 
capabilities. What works for New York’s Megan’s Law is not necessarily right for any other 
state.
ASORA falls far below an “excessive” point because the legislature narrowly tailored the 
statute to protect the public. As explained with the sixth Kennedy factor, sex offenders pose a 
tremendous threat to the public because they re-offend in high rates. Alaska H. 69, 18lh Leg., 2d 
Sess. § 1. ASORA provides parents and authorities with accurate public information that helps 
Alaskans protect themselves and others. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087.
The possibility that the Internet feature of ASORA exposes sex offenders to worldwide 
ostracism preoccupies the Ninth Circuit in the opinion below. Otte, 259 F.3d at 994. The 
advantages of ASORA’s Internet access far outweigh the Ninth Circuit’s concern. The Internet 
is the most effective tool to provide concerned parents with local sex offenders’ identities, 
residences, and workplaces, which allows parents to monitor their children’s interactions with 
possibly dangerous sex offenders. Without the ASORA disclosure system, Alaska’s parents 
caimot take the easy steps afforded by ASORA to monitor their children’s relationships with 
known offenders. The ASORA Internet feature streamlines the disclosure process and provides 
more accurate and timely information to parents about sex offenders in their neighborhood.
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ASORA differentiates among sex offenders as to the severity of their past crimes and 
tiers the length of time for which sex offenders must register. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(d). For 
the assigned length of time, ASORA simply requires sex offenders to provide public information 
on a periodic basis. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010. ASORA passively discloses the public 
information to concerned citizens who choose to access the site. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087. The 
methods ASORA uses to collect and disclose sex offender information are not excessive in light 
of the legislature’s important and legitimate intent to protect the public.
C. The sex offenders fail to carry their burden of the ^‘clearest proof’ that ASORA so 
punishes sex offenders that this Court should override the Alaska legislature’s 
intent to protect its citizens.
An override of the civil intent of the legislature requires the “clearest proof’ that ASORA 
so punishes sex offenders in purpose or effect that this Court should declare it unconstitutional.
448 U.S. at 249. The seven factors of the Kennedy test evidence that ASORA is civil in 
purpose and effect: ASORA does not disable, restrain, or punish offenders; it does not attach 
only on the basis of scienter or criminal behavior; and it rationally and proportionately relates to 
the legislature’s goal to help the public protect itself
No set number Kennedy factors equals the “clearest proof’ of a criminal law, but case 
law establishes that it is a heavy burden of proof Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. This Court looked 
at five of the Kennedy factors in Hudson and found that, even though some of the factors cut 
both ways, the movant failed to show that the monetary penalties and debarment sanctions acted 
as criminal laws. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105. The Hudson Court showed how the Kennedy factors 
could cut both ways but still prevail as civil. Id. For example, a statute may act as a deterrent 
and yet serve as an effective regulatory, thus civil, statute. Id. Here, the factors all tend toward a 
civil nature. Even if this Court finds that a few of the factors cut toward a criminal nature, the
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sex offenders fail to show the “clearest proof* required by the fVarc/ test. 448 U.S. at 249. 
ASORA*s methods to collect and disclose sex offender information are civil in nature and do not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit struck down the entire ASORA system because it held that ASORA 
punishes sex offenders excessively in relation to the public safety goal. Oae, 259 F.3d at 986. In 
essence, the Ninth Circuit only decided that the disclosure mechanism punishes sex offenders.
Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that only the disclosure provision is unconstitutional.
Alaska statute 01.10.030 states that all laws enacted by the legislature that do not contain 
a severability clause shall be construed as though they contained one. Alaska Stat. § 01.10.030 
(2001). This Court should read the following language into ASORA: "If any provision of this 
Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this 
Act and the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
If this Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit, despite the evidence of ASORA’s regulatory 
effect that controls the Kennedy test and compels a non-punitive conclusion, this Court should 
reverse the Ninth Circuit in part, and only declare the disclosure provision unconstitutional. The 
Alaska legislature deserves the opportunity to refashion a disclosure provision that fits within 
their needs and the holding of this Court. The ASORA registration system remains good law 
even if the disclosure system is held unconstitutional.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO ALASKA AND CONNECTICUT’S
REASONABLE LEGISLATION BECAUSE THE STATES MUST PROTECT THEIR 
CITIZENS FROM UNPREDICTABLE RECIDIVISM AND THEIR SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRIES DO NO MORE THAN ALLOW PEOPLE TO PROTECT 
THEMSELVES.
This country faces a devastating problem; states are unable to prevent thousands of cases
of sex abuse and need more resources to apprehend sex offenders. Sexual crimes leave the
victims prone to depression, anxiety, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and involvement in
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sexually or physically abusive relationships. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1,13 (1995). Sex offender 
registries with public Internet access combat this problem because they allow parents to keep 
their children out of harm’s way. Parents can look at the website, identify sex offenders in their 
neighborhood, and ensure that their children are not put in an inappropriate situation with the sex 
offenders. The Alaska and Connecticut website registries, like those of all other states, breed 
safety, not stigmatization.
Alaska and Connecticut adapted the basic framework of the federally endorsed Megan’s 
Law and tailored it to their own needs. The Alaska and Connecticut legislatures are in the best 
position to decide what type of notification system fits their state budgets and their public safety 
needs. Mich. Dept, of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990). Courts should review 
legislation to safeguard the basic legal rights of citizens, but not to impose policy. Id. State 
governments understand local problems and policy constraints and have the right to decide 
which rational policy alternative best serves the public’s interest.
This Court has held that “courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative 
judgments” where the issue involves an area that is scientifically uncertain. Jones v. U.S., 463 
U.S. 354, 365 (1983). \n Jones, this Court upheld a D.C. statute that requires the district to 
commit individuals that a criminal court acquitted by reason of mental insanity to a mental 
institute until they can prove they no longer pose a danger to society, even if it is longer than the 
maximum sentence for the crime. Id. at 356-60. This Court upheld the statute as constitutional 
because the “present state of mental knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease ... has not 
reached finality of judgment.” Id. at 365. For this reason, this Court deferred to the legislature’s 
reasonable judgment to protect society. Id. See also Marshall v. U.S., 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) 
(“When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.
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legislative options should be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite 
legislation.”); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11,25 (1905) (“[T]he police power of a State must 
... embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as 
will protect the public health and public safety ”)
The federal and state legislatures learned from experience that there is no foolproof 
method to determine which sex offenders will re-offend. As a group, sex offenders are more 
likely than other offenders to re-offend with sexual and/or violent crimes. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 
16-17 (1995). This tendency to re-offend does not decrease over time. Id. at 17. Similar to the 
problem of mental illness addressed in Jones, current knowledge on sex offender recidivism has 
not reached finality of judgment. In light of the high rates of recidivism, the Connecticut and 
Alaska legislatures enacted sex offender registry acts to allow parents to protect their children.
In accordance with the Jones holding, this Court should defer to the legislatures’ reasonable 
decisions in this area. The legislatures should enjoy broad options to combat a problem that 
devastates the many victims of sexual offenses, their families, and the very core of society. The 
Constitution should not prevent society from protecting itself against the potential rc-offense ot 
those most feared crimes, and those crimes that victimize the most vulnerable and defenseless* 
the children of society.
CONCLUSION
Connecticut did not deprive the convicted offenders listed in the sex offender registry ot a 
protected liberty interest because it did not defame the sex offenders when it disclosed true and 
accurate criminal histories. Connecticut did not alter or impair the sex offenders’ legal status 
because the underlying offenses that the sex offenders committed caused the alleged plus factor. 
Connecticut has a strong interest to protect the public from the risk of re-offense by convicted
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sex offenders and to conserve its scarce financial resources. These factors weigh against 
requiring Connecticut to hold a hearing that would have no benefit. Petitioners respectfully 
request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit on the due process claim.
ASORA collects and discloses details about sex offenders to help the public protect itself, 
not to punish offenders. The effect of the statute is non-punitive because it does not disable or 
restrain offenders, it does not serve the traditional goals of punishment, and it rationally and 
narrowly relates to the purpose of helping the public help itself. Given that ASORA does not 
increase the punishment for sex offenses committed prior to the statute s enactment, there is no 
ex post facto violation. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the judgment 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ex post facto claim.
Respectfully submitted.
Leah Scholer
Counsel for Petitioners
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